Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia Review

Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia
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Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia ReviewWhy have some states been more successful at facilitating rapid economic growth than others? "Paths to Development in Asia" compares the experiences of Korea, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam to help provide answers. Many had thought that the end of the Soviet Union meant that the states' role would now be greatly limited. Instead, it turned out that in developing Asian nations, controlled mobilization and suppression of the populace had a positive effect on state cohesion and subsequent economic development, while mass incorporation (democracy) and laissez-faire policies did not. Vu also points out that the 'big-bang' mode has been the prevalent mechanism of state formation in recent years - a mode that facilitates wholesale change.

Vu's examination begins with South Korea. Vu contends that several elements helped create a foundation of strong societal cohesion in Korea prior to its economic rise. One of the first was that both prior to and after the Korean War, the populations of both South and North Korea tended to sort themselves out - supporters of Kim Il Sung went north, while those favoring Rhee stayed or went South. Syngman Rhee, South Korea's first leader after the end of WWII, had initiated land reform in that nation over the 1949-54 period. Peasants were required to pay landlords in installments for land received, a requirement that the Korean Communist Party opposed. In return, Rhee violently suppressed that opposition group, and others. Prior to Rhee, the Japanese had built a cadre of efficient officials and a large police force to replace the corrupt, inefficient monarchy that had existed. The Japanese had also aligned themselves with wealthy Korean entrepreneurs using subsidies, loans, contracts, and strict controls over workers - providing a history of stable industry and work relations. Rhee's government had also used propaganda and coercion to eg. get peasants to replace thatched roofs with composition or tile (eliminate a major fire hazard) - laggards had their roofs torn off by local officials. Rhee's resignation, however, was forced by student protests over 1960 election violence, fueled by the preceding rapid expansion of its education system, and a declining economy. General Park then seized power, declared martial law, and dissolved the National Assembly - leaving himself solely in charge with little/no viable opposition force.

Rhee had contributed decisively to building a unified development structure, but failed to use it to pursue development. The country was in economic decline - lagging even North Korea. General Park seized power after Rhee's abdication, declared martial law, and dissolved the National Assembly - leaving himself solely in charge with little/no opposition force. However, Park was still facing that same spectre of economic decline, as well as potential rivals in the military. Thus, he quickly proceeded to use the nation's cohesion to focus on building South Korea's economy.

Switching to China, Vu observes that when Mao declared the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, he had a cohesive core of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders already well imbued with the 'correct line,' plus a loyal four million-man military. CCP administrative power extended down to the village level, and its strength so impressed Stalin that he provided Soviet aid (men, materials, money). Campaigns against 'anti-revolutionaries' and former loyalist followers of Chiang Kai Shek further unified the society. Then came land-reform cooperatives (resisted at first) which eventually seemed to further unify the peasants and destroy opposing elites, but left smoldering resentment.

Mao then made three more successive major errors that undermined cohesion. First came the 1957 campaign ('Let 1,000 flowers bloom') that was supposed to allow mild criticisms of government leaders; when the criticisms turned into an unexpected torrent, Mao's 'Anti-Rightist' campaign followed - again aimed at solidifying support. Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' followed in 1958, and was his next major mistake, directly responsible for an estimated 20 million deaths due to starvation and the loss of Soviet support (they thought he was 'crazy'). Mao's fourth major error was launching the Cultural Revolution' (1965-68) to stomp out thinking resentful of CCP leadership up to that point. Mao's death in 1976 left a populace highly resentful of CCP leadership to-date; that leadership, in turn, realized that it needed to quickly implement economic improvement to stay in power. Their first act was to free the peasants from major government dictates (what to grow, etc.), as well as the requirements and limitations of communal living and farming. These steps quickly eliminated a major source of peasant discontent and boosted food supplies (a major concern for the entire nation). Soon after came the leaders' decision to continue linking CCP officials' career paths to performance - only now it would be that of their area's economic progress. China had again become unified, cohesive, and ready for major change.

Similarly, with other Asian nations, per Vu's accounting. He also points out instances when Asian nations' ability to grow was limited by lack of unity - India (a number of castes, multiple political parties) offers a prime example.

Summarizing, Vu concludes that "all states are not born equally - some are better endowed with cohesive structures" than others. However, he also quotes Chalmers Johnson's observation that though authoritarianism is the most common regime type, it rarely is accompanied by high-speed, equitable economic growth. Apparently, cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient requirement.Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia Overview

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